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ABSTRACT 
This paper was inspired by a preliminary report on product liability in New 
Zealand that the writer prepared for the Ministry of Consumer Affairs in 1995. 
In overseas jurisdictions there is a substantial body of theory and law on the 
subject of product liability, which has been recognised as a separate area of the 
law for over 30 years. 
New Zealand has never considered product liability to be a unique area of the 
law, distinct from traditional tort and contract theory and assorted statutory 
provisions. Although product liability was briefly considered by the Torts and 
General Law Reform Committee in 1974, remarkably little analysis has been 
carried out in respect of New Zealand's product liability legal and policy 
framework. 
The paper aims to remedy this state of affairs by using the overseas experience 
of product liability to assess the adequacy of New Zealand's approach to 
product liability, in terms of the international standardisation of laws and 
internal consistency within New Zealand, and against "ideal" policy goals. 
Most of New Zealand's trading partners have reformed their law to such a 
degree that universal principles and standards have developed. The paper will 
consider whether New Zealand should become a part of this standardisation 
process, providing an introduction to the vast area of the law that product 
liability is becoming in other countries, and advancing options that New Zealand 
may consider in the future. 
The following discussion does not purport to be a comprehensive account of 
product liability in New Zealand in the past, present and future. Instead it aims 
to provide the reader with a grasp of the issues involved so as to stimulate 
further consideration and analysis of specific aspects of product liability. 
WORD LENGTI-I 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 15800 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION - CONSUMER POLICY 
A The Development of Consumerism 
A primary concern of consumer policy is to redress power imbalances in consumer transactions. 
There are two parties in the power struggle - consumers and producers. Consumers are those who 
"consume" the goods and services provided by the producers. 
consumer n. 2 a user of an article or commodity. A buyer of goods or services.
1 
As individuals we are all consumers, because we are constantly purchasing, acquiring or using 
goods or services that have been produced by others. 
Both elements of the above definition will play a part in the following discussion of product 
liability in New Zealand. The person who suffers injury or loss will often be the purchaser of the 
defective goods that caused the loss, or the donee of those goods. However, this paper will 
illustrate that adopting a restrictive definition of "consumer" in the product liability context can 
lead to anomalous results when considering available means of redress. In this paper, a consumer 
will be "a user of an article or commodity" unless stated otherwise. The paper is primarily 
concerned with non-commercial consumers, or consumers who use goods ordinarily acquired for 
personal, domestic or household use or consumption. 
Traditionally, consumers have been at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the producers. Consumers as 
individuals typically tend to be ill informed about the goods they buy, ill informed about their 
rights in relation to those goods, lacking in any substantial bargaining power and therefore unable 
to exercise any real control over the producer. Caveat emptor2 developed at a time when traders 
and buyers met in the open markets to buy and sell goods. Goods were not technologically 
complex, and purchasers could readily detect inferior quality goods by a visual inspection. With 
this in mind the courts were reluctant to go beyond the contract in cases where goods subsequently 
became manifestly defective. 
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary L Brown (ed) (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993). 
A phrase literally meaning "Let the buyer beware". This was a concept developed by the judiciary to 
give effect to the notion that ultimately the consumer was responsible for his or her own purchasing 
decisions. 
LA,V LIBHI • 1 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF hc.Lllt·H.~ 1 U P.ii 
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To go beyond the contract involved interfering with the rights of parties to make contracts at anns 
length, which would have affected the "sanctity" of the contract that had been made. The courts 
therefore sought to preserve anus-length commercial arrangements without undue interference. 
The onus was placed on buyers to ensure that what they bought was not defective. 
During the twentieth century, producers have been developing and manufacturing goods which are 
increasingly complex. Modem consumers generally have insufficient technical knowledge to 
determine the quality of the goods they buy simply by a visual inspection. Latent defects may not 
manifest themselves for some time after purchase. The courts began to recognise the difficulties 
associated with the dawn of the technological era and gradually developed implied contractual 
terms at common law to temper the harsh effects of the outdated caveat emptor doctrine. Notions 
such as "merchantability of goods" and "fitness for purpose" were invoked and became more 
commonplace until New Zealand eventually codified these concepts, amongst others, into the Sale 
of Goods Act 1908. Until the Courts began to erode the concept of caveat emptor the power 
balance between buyer and seller lay strongly in favour of the seller. This was the genesis of 
modem consumer policy. 
B The Nature of Consumer Policy 
1 Protectionism 
Consumer policy is inseparably involved with protectionist measures. The key is in deciding to 
what extent the law should protect consumers from the vagaries of the market. Traditional free 
market economics considers that a market will function most effectively with minimal regulatory 
interference from the State. The theory hinges on the notion that the market will be "self-
regulating" - consumers will have control over the market and the producers by exercising choice 
in the form of purchasing decisions. Although it may be a valid theoretical model it is perhaps too 
optimistic, as it presumes the existence of perfect market conditions. In reality the operation of the 
market is far from perfect. Market failure is inherent in our system - consumers are not sufficiently 
active in pursuing their rights and the large power imbalances mean that consumers do not 
adequately meet their required role in the laisser-fairel free market theory. 
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Consumer policy therefore reflects the pragmatic notion that consumers are not sufficiently 
powerful to survive in a market unassisted by regulatory measures. For example, consumer policy 
regulates some businesses by imposing minimum safety standards on certain classes of products.
3 
However, it also recognises that consumers will and do make bad purchasing choices even if they 
have sufficient information available on which they can base a purchasing decision. In this 
situation the law may also provide a remedy.
4 
Consumer policy aims to regulate the market to the least degree necessary, so as to empower 
consumers, redress imbalances, and at the same time, create a competitive, functional market in 
which consumers play an important role. 
2 Competing Policy Goals 
Consumer policy must therefore balance two competing policy goals. First, it recognises that 
consumers need enforceable rights to protect their individual social and economic interests. This 
reflects the protectionist role of consumer policy. It provides consumers with a crutch upon which 
to lean when dealing with producers/manufacturers. 
5 
Second, the protectionist function must be weighed against the overall economic interests of the 
market. Excess regulation can inhibit trade and hinder a fully competitive market.
6 Consumer 
policy realises that an excessively interventionist approach is not economically sound in the long 
run as it may ultimately act to the detriment of the consumer. 
Consumer law is the product of this balancing act. 
4 
6 
See for example Part III of the Fair Trading Act 1986 which allows for the creation of product safety 
standards. 
For example, see the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 generally. 
In this paper, the "manufacturer" will often include the designer. Certain product liability issues will 
arise in respect of designers in particular. These will be addressed separately. 
Observe the application of the Commerce Act 1986 by the Commerce Commission, which regulates 
trade to the minimum degree necessary in order to foster fair competition. This is particularly relevant 
in the telecommunications industry at the present time. 
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C New Zealand's Approach to Consumer Policy 
Those who create consumer policy in New Zealand aim to achieve a competitive market involving 
the least possible Government intervention, while at the same time protecting consumers' 
fundamental rights and empowering them so as to enhance the functioning of the market. 
7 
New Zealand has adopted a piecemeal approach towards the implementation of consumer policy. 
The legislature, in implementing such policy, has preferred not to create broad, "umbrella" 
consumer laws. Rather, the approach has been to address particular problems as and when they 
arise. Consequently, New Zealand has a wide range of different laws relating to consumer policy 
which address specific issues. 
Mulholland has suggested that legislation which serves to alienate the business community in this 
country will not find favour; 
The Government relies upon the business community for the implementation of much of its 
policy and it would not serve any Government to unnecessarily irritate the business 
. 8 
commuruty. 
Although consumer policy can sometimes be difficult to implement in New Zealand, it can be 
achieved through a combination of several factors. First, by clearly illustrating a need for reform, 
and second, by consumers voicing their concerns and making themselves heard in a co-ordinated 
approach to lobbying.9 
Product liability reform is the focus of this paper. Many manufacturers and members of the 
business community will view product liability reform as being inherently adverse to their 
interests. As can be seen from recent debates in Australia on this issue prior to the enactment of 
reform in that country in 1992, the industry sector was strongly opposed to the proposed reform. 
10 
10 
C Stigley "Fair Trading: The New Zealand Experience" Conference Address, JASCA Conference, 
Kyoto, Japan, 1994. 
RD Mulholland Consumer Law in New Zealand (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1982) 22. 
An example of such a co-ordinated approach can be seen in the current efforts of the Choice in 
Accident Compensation Campaign towards the review of accident compensation legislation. 
For example, "No Justice in Law Reform Proposals : Business Leaders" Australian Financial Review, , 
Australia, 11 September 1989, 15; and "The Perils of Product Liability" Business Review Weekly, 
Australia, 8 December I 989, 94. 
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It would come as no surprise that any such reform in New Zealand may be met with similar 
resistance and therefore product liability reform is low on the list of political priorities. 
Nevertheless, as will be seen in the remainder of this paper, there is a need for some degree of 
reform in this area. It will consider some of the issues facing policy makers when considering the 
current state of product liability in New Zealand. It will also consider options for product liability 
regulation in the future. 
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II PRODUCT LIABILITY 
A Product Sa/ ety v. Product Liability 
The promotion of consumer safety is a key objective of consumer policy. Consumer safety policy 
has two components. 
1 Product safety regulation 
Product safety measures focus on actively promoting the distribution of safe products onto the 
consumer markets. These measures aim to prevent or minimise the risk of entry of unsafe 
products. Product safety is generally proactive, aimed at prevention of injury by imposing uniform 
regulatory standards on manufacturers. These measures generally create offences and carry 
punitive provisions for non-compliance.
11 
2 Product Liability 
In any consumer protection framework, product liability is a strongly protectionist measure. The 
principle of product liability recognises that no preventative framework can provide absolute 
protection for the consumer. Rather than having a direct punitive focus against the offending 
manufacturer, product liability provides rights and remedies to compensate victims when an unsafe 
product causes injury or damage after finding its way into the hands of the consumer. Product 
liability is largely a reactive concept, addressing the issue of compensating the individual when 
damage or injury does occur. However, an important consequence of imposing product liability is 
the potential deterrent effect which ensures that manufacturers take care in the production of goods. 
Product safety and product liability measures complement each other in this way. 
JI See for example Part III of the Fair Trading Act 1986 and its relationship with s40 "Offences". 
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Whether or not the consumer takes all possible care, the reality is that some products will 
inevitably fail to meet up to the expected standard. When products fail, they are capable of causing 
injury, death or damage to other property and economic loss. 
B The Policy Underlying Product Liability 
In practice, no amount of regulation will be able to prevent some defective products from finding 
their way onto the market. Where these products cause injury or damage, and the loss was 
attributable to the actions of the manufacturer rather than the consumer, then the manufacturer is 
generally required to make good that loss. 
Consumer policy imposes this obligation on the manufacturer on the basis of social and economic 
policy. If individuals were required to bear the full cost of injury or damage themselves, the 
potential for drain on welfare systems is increased due to the individual's possible inability to work 
for a long period of time, requirements for healthcare, and inequitable financial losses which the 
individual is left to bear. Under this scenario, the loss is not allocated to the person best able to 
avoid it, and it would create unacceptable direct losses for the individual, and indirect losses for the 
State and the market as a whole. 
Policy makers believe that liability for such loss should lie with the person or persons who are in 
the best position to avoid the possibility of loss.
12 This premise has several practical policy 
benefits. 
First, the loss is generally borne by persons (the manufacturer) who are more capable of bearing 
the loss than the individual consumer. Through pricing mechanisms and insurance, the cost is 
indirectly borne by the consuming public as a whole. 
13 Goldring notes that this cost/price 
mechanism "requires the manufacturer or supplier to make a decision which reflects 'optimal' 
12 
13 
Law Reform Commission of Australia Product Liability - Discussion paper No. 34 (Law Reform 
Commiss ion, Sydney, 1988). 
Note that community responsibility was a fundamental tenet of the accident compensation scheme as 
originally enacted in 1972. See the findings of the Royal Commiss ion to Inquire into and Report upon 
Worker's Compensation Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry (Government Print, Wellington, 1967). 
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levels of loss prevention".
14 The result is effective pricing which reflects the true cost of the 
product. Accordingly, those who receive the benefits from the production or use of the product 
collectively bear the costs associated with that product. Ultimately the product's survival on the 
market depends on competitive pricing. 
Second, the potential for liability creates an incentive towards the production of goods that will not 
cause loss. Attributing liability to a manufacturer acts as an indirect regulatory measure. No 
manufacturer wants to be sued because it may result in a direct financial loss and unwanted 
negative publicity which will ultimately have an adverse impact on the manufacturer's business as 
a whole. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission concluded that product liability policy has two key 
b. · 15 o ~ectives: 
• The provision of incentives for the optimal level of risk prevention, and 
• The efficient provision of adequate and appropriate compensation where goods cause loss 
because they act in ways that could not reasonably be expected. 
These objectives will be adopted as the benchmark policy objectives for the reform issues in this 
paper. 
C Sources of Product Liability Remedies 
There are three basic sources of product liability remedies - contract, tort and statutory duty. 
1 Contract 
Contractual remedies are based on the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties. 
The policy basis behind contractual remedies is that the parties are entitled to have their 
14 
15 
J Goldring "Reforming Australian Product Liability Laws: processes and problems of law reform" 
(1989) I Bond Law Review 193-2 17. 
Above n 14,206. 
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expectations on the contract fulfilled. Common law and the Sale of Goods Act 1908 give the 
consumer the right to invoke implied contractual terms of "merchantability" and "fitness for 
purpose" which can be relied upon in the event that the goods do not match the expected standard 
or quality. 
2 Tort 
In comparison, tort law seeks to compensate a person who suffers injury or loss due to a tortious 
act or omission by another person. As a product liability vehicle, tort law often involves concepts 
of negligence, or fault-based liability. 
Tort theory has a fundamentally different basis to contract theory. Tort law focuses on safety and 
the rights of individuals not to be harmed by unsafe goods. Contract law acknowledges that 
contracting parties have a right to expect certain quality standards from the goods they purchase. 
Contractual liability protects the economic interests of contracting parties by compensating them 
for unsatisfied expectations relating to the product. Liability may give rise to consequential 
damages. Tort liability is not based on the product in question but on the behaviour of the 
manufacturer, and whether the manufacturer's conduct matches "reasonable" standards of conduct 
in society, such that the conduct will either be allowed, or not tolerated. Liability is established by 
way of a cost/benefit analysis, weighing foreseeability of damage and compliance costs against the 
right not to be injured by another's action. 
3 Statutory duties 
Statutory duties are imposed on manufacturers by the legislature. They often set out a number of 
conditions. If one of these conditions is breached, the purchaser will have a right of action under 
the legislation for compensation. Actions under the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 fit into this 
category. 
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4 The development of strict liability 
Strict product liability has developed as a hybrid category in recent times. In the United States it 
was developed through the extension of tort law. In many other countries, in particular, the EU, 
Australia and Japan, it has taken on characteristics of tort law and statutory obligations. Under a 
strict product liability system, the claimant does not have to prove that the manufacturer of a 
defective product was at fault or negligent in some way. Subject to certain defences, the claimant 
is entitled to compensation from the manufacturer if the claimant can show that the offending 
product was "defective" according to certain criteria, and that the defect caused loss or injury. Note 
that strict liability is not the same as absolute liability. Manufacturers will not be automatically 
liable for all product-related damage or loss. A claimant is still required to identify a defect in the 
product. Contrast this with negligence, where the claimant must also show that the damage was 
caused by a negligent act or omission on the part of the manufacturer or some other person. 
The policy underlying strict product liability is primarily concerned with compensating individuals 
for injury and loss. This is a concern it shares with tort law. However, the product liability laws in 
the countries referred to are enacted into domestic law and have much in common with the 
"statutory duty" category. These laws are also concerned with the spreading of risk, influencing the 
making of decisions by business and consumers about what goods are to be produced, what 
characteristics they should have, what goods should be consumed and how they should be used by 
consumers. 16 It could be argued that this model has imported some of the "expectation" elements 
of contract law. The doctrine is concerned more with the behaviour of the defective product that 
with the behaviour of the manufacturer. 
5 Conclusions 
Product liability remedies have evolved from different theoretical sources which were originally 
developed to address situations that did not necessarily involve product liability. Each remedy 
therefore requires the claimant to satisfy a different evidentiary burden and results in a different 
16 Several of these ideas have been drawn from J Goldring, L W Maher and J McKeough Consumer 
Protection Law (Federation Press, Sydney, 1993) 94. 
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measure of damages, due to the conceptual differences between them. These differences can lead 
to inconsistencies both in remedy and procedure when applied to product liability situations. Most 
countries have implemented several of the models into their domestic law at various times. 
Currently the statutory strict liability model has been finding favour internationally. The various 
merits and disadvantages of each model will be discussed in more depth later. 
This paper will not discuss product safety regulation, which although part of the overall consumer 
safety framework, is concerned more with preventative and punitive action rather than the rights of 
injured consumers to seek compensation. Similarly, product liability as stated in the EC Directive 
is only concerned with consequential loss resulting from defective products. 
17 This paper will not 
examine remedies available to the consumer for replacement of the defective product itself.
18 The 
focus of the paper is on the harm caused by the defective product. 
D Defectiveness 
This paper will frequently refer to "defective products". It is useful to consider what is meant 
by a defect in this context. Several commentators have categorised defects into these three 
19 
types. 
1 Manufacturing Defects 
A manufacturing defect occurs where the product or a batch inadvertently fails due to some 
miscarriage in the production, transportation or storage process. Products containing such 
defects may fail to meet up to the manufacturer's usual standards for a number of reasons, 
including; incorporation of faulty components, 
20 misassembly of the product by an employee, 
an accident in storage or mispackaging. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Article 9 of the Directive of the Council of European Communities on Product Liability 85/374 (25 July 
1985). 
Other actions can be brought for the replacement of the defective product itself. Most of these actions 
will be based on contract or the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, as generally only the purchaser of the 
goods will want compensation. 
EE Beerworth Contemporary Issues in Product Liability Law (Federation Press, Sydney, 199 l) l l. 
For example, a rotor-bolt that was not manufactured to specification and caused a helicopter to crash in 
Helicopter Sales (Australia) Pty Ltd v Rotor-Work Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 1. 
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2 Design Defects 
A design defect occurs where the design of the product is at fault. It is distinguished from the 
manufacturing defect on the basis that the defect will be inherent in all examples of the 
product, and the product does in fact meet the manufacturer's specifications. 
3 Information Defects 
An informational defect will occur where the product will become faulty if used in a certain 
way, or if certain precautions are not taken, and a warning is not given by the manufacturer. 
The manufacturer may have an obligation to bring this information to the attention of the 
consumer. 
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III PRODUCT LIABILITY IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Introduction 
As with other consumer issues, product liability has been the subject of a piecemeal approach by 
the legislature. Unlike many other countries, New Zealand does not have one "product liability" 
law,
21 but addresses product liability in statutes that are not specifically directed at the issue, and 
also through the use of traditional common law remedies. This approach will be criticised on the 
basis that it leads to inconsistencies between rights and remedies in respect of the same defective 
product. 
Damage caused by defective products fits into one of three classes, personal injury, consequential 
property damage and pure economic loss. 
The first category, personal injury, tends to receive the most publicity. As can be seen from the 
experience in the United States over the past 30 years, personal injury caused by defective products 
triggers an emotional response in most people due to the high value which our society places on 
human life. The emotional sympathy for those who are physically injured leads some United 
States juries to award punitive and compensatory damages at a quantum which New Zealand juries 
would find hard to comprehend. 
22 
The second category, property damage, tends to attract much less attention, but nevertheless creates 
important rights of action that are upheld by the courts. The third category, pure economic loss, is a 
developing area of the law characterised by economic loss suffered (for example, loss of future 
profits) which is not a consequence of any physical harm.
23 
In comparison with other developed nations in the worldwide trading community, New Zealand 
currently has a unique approach to resolving product liability claims involving personal injury. Due 
21 
22 
23 
Most of the EU countries have enacted product liability laws based on the same model, which will be 
discussed later. Japan and Australia have also recently enacted similar laws. 
Charlotte Mahlum suffered serious health problems as a result of faulty silicone breast implants. On 29 
October 1995 a Texas jury ordered Dow Chemical to pay her $14.1 million in damages, consisting of 
$3.9 million compensatory damages and $10 million punitive damages. 
Junior Books v Veitchi Co Ltd [ 1982] 2 All ER 201. 
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to the existence of a no-fault compensation scheme in respect of personal injury in New Zealand, a 
practical distinction is drawn between: 
• Liability where defective products cause personal injury or death. 
• Liability where defective products cause damage or loss to property ( consequential property 
damage) and pure economic loss. 
B Remedies where Defective Products Cause Personal Injury: the 
Accident Compensation Scheme 
Consumers who use defective products risk suffering personal injury or even death. New Zealand 
currently has a no-fault statutory compensation scheme for persons who suffer personal injury that 
is covered by the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 ("ARCIA"). This 
scheme has effectively shifted the onus of compensating the injured person from the negligent 
individual to the State via levies on employers, motorists and the taxpayer. This paper will not 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the scheme, but will concentrate on elements that are relevant 
to product liability in New Zealand. 
New Zealand's first comprehensive no-fault compensation regime for personal injury was enacted 
in 1972. No other scheme in the world to date has been as broad in its cover and entitlements. 
After a revamp in 1982, serious reform was carried through in 1992 by the ARCIA. This paper 
discusses the effect of the ARCIA, being the scheme in force at the time of writing.
24 
1 
24 
What Constitutes "Cover" Under the Act? 
The ARCIA has come under considerable critical scrutiny since its enactment. Criticisms have been 
advanced by a variety of different political and non-political bodies, including the Insurance Council of 
New Zealand, The NZ Business Roundtable and the NZ Manufacturers Federation, all of whom are 
advocating such reform. See for example "Insurers seek ACC role" The Independent, New Zealand, 4 
May 1996, 22. 
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The Act awards compensation to injured persons, regardless of who caused the injury, if certain 
criteria specified by the ARCIA are met. The Accident Compensation Corporation ("ACC"/
5 will 
provide compensation where a person suffers a "personal injury"
26 in a certain range of 
circumstances, including: 
Section 8(2)(a) accident, 
(b) gradual process, disease or infection arising out of and in the course of 
employment, 
( c) medical misadventure, 
(d) consequence of treatment for personal injury. 
In product liability cases, the most likely way the Act's cover will extend to personal injury is by 
accident and medical misadventure. The Act defines "personal injury", "accident" 
27 and "medical 
misadventure". 
28 
A personal injury is essentially a physical injury to a person and any mental injury suffered by that 
person that is an outcome of those physical injuries. 
"Accident" is defined in a way that is open to several possible interpretations.
29 The most common 
interpretation involves the application of a force or resistance external to the human body and is a 
specific identifiable event or series of events. 
An injury will happen as a result of "medical misadventure" if the injury was due to "medical 
error" or "medical mishap" at the hands of a "registered health professional".
30 
2 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Removal of the Right to Sue 
The ACC is the body set up to administer the handling of personal injury claims under the ARCIA. 
"Personal injury" is defined in section 4 of the ARCIA. 
"Accident" is defined in section 3. 
"Medical misadventure" is defined in section 5. 
See section 3 of the ARCIA. 
These terms are all defined in the ARCIA; "medical error" and "medical mishap" - section 5(1), 
"registered health professional" - section 3. 
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In common with both the 1972 and 1982 Acts, the ARCIA removes the right to sue for 
compensatory damages in respect of personal injuries that are covered by the Act.
3 1 A person who 
suffers personal injury falling within the Act's cover is limited to suing for exemplary damages if 
this is appropriate. 
The natural consequence of this restriction is that a person whose injuries fall outside the cover of 
the ARCIA may seek compensatory damages in the courts. Due to the narrower definitions of 
"personal injury" and "cover" in the 1992 Act, a number of injuries that would have been covered 
by the previous two Acts are now excluded from the cover of the 1992 Act. If the Act does not 
cover the injury then the injured person will be entitled to bring a claim for common law 
compensatory damages in a New Zealand court.
32 
Under section 14(5) of the ARCIA, the court now makes the ultimate determination about whether 
the injuries suffered are covered by the Act. Prior to 1992, this issue had to be referred to the ACC 
for determination. Under the 1992 Act the ACC must be a party to any proceedings that 
determines this question. 
3 Exemplary Damages 
Recent developments in New Zealand's common law mean that in future a plaintiff may be able to 
bring a successful action for exemplary damages in a negligence case. None of the accident 
compensation Acts have barred a common law claim for exemplary damages where the injury was 
covered by the Act.
33 Courts have traditionally awarded exemplary damages where there is 
aggravating behaviour that warrants a measure of damages which can be awarded against a 
defendant as a form of punishment for "high-handed" behaviour. Claims for exemplary damages 
have not generally been available in actions based on claims of negligence, on the grounds that the 
application of force was not intentional.
34 However, the recent case of Akavi v Taylor
35 has 
31 This prohibition is stated in section 14 of the ARCIA. 
32 Subject to the injured person ' s ability to state a tenable cause of action such as negligence. 
33 Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR 97. 
34 See Tay lor v Beere [ 1982] 1 NZLR 81 , per Somers J. 
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suggested that "reduced availability and quantum of accident compensation may lead the courts to 
extend the concept of negligence and permit common law damages to be awarded."
36 In the most 
recent statement on exemplary damages in New Zealand at the time of writing, Tipping J has noted 
that "it is not a proper function of the Courts to develop the law of7 exemplary damages so as to 
remedy any perceived shortcomings in the statutory scheme".
37 
Australian courts have extended the award of exemplary damages to include negligence cases in 
certain circumstances. In Caloca v BP Australia Ltd,
38 the Court held that the recovery of 
exemplary damages was governed by the conduct of the wrongdoer and not the nature of the tort. 
Several New Zealand cases have considered the possibility of awarding exemplary damages in 
negligence situations.39 To date the only New Zealand case in which exemplary damages have 
actually been awarded to a plaintiff in this situation is Somerville v McLaren Transport. 
40 In this 
case the defendant (automotive garage) knowingly ignored safety procedures that should have 
been used to prevent an over-inflated tyre exploding and causing injury to bystanders. The 
decision of Everitt DCJ to award the plaintiff $15,000 exemplary damages was upheld on 
appeal by Tipping J, who, after a detailed and practical analysis of Commonwealth law 
relating to exemplary damages, clarified the current exemplary damages test into the 
following statement, 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Exemplary damages for negligence causing personal injury may be awarded if, but only if, 
the level of negligence is so high that it amounts to an outrageous and flagrant disregard for 
the plaintiffs safety, meriting condemnation and punishment.
41 
[1995] NZAR 33. See also Blanchard J's comments in Boustridge v Attorney-Genera/ Unreported, 29 
September 1993, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 54/93 . 
See Akavi, above n 35 , 33 . 
See below n 40, 20. 
(1992) ATR 81-153 . 
See for example Akavi v Tay lor Preston, above n 35, Boustridge v Attorney-Genera/ above n 35 , 
Iverson v Zen de/ Industries Unreported, 8 June 1993, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 2171/91 , W v 
Counties Manukau Health Ltd [ 1995] 2 NZLR 560. These cases all involved strikeout applications. 
Unreported, 13 August 1996, High Court, Dunedin Registry , AP 2/96. 
Above n 40, 23. 
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This decision appears to have laid the groundwork for plaintiffs suing for exemplary damages 
in personal injury claims arising out of negligence. The development is significant for product 
liability claims in New Zealand. If a manufacturer knows that a negligent manufacturing process is 
in place but refuses to remedy the problem because compliance costs are high, then courts might be 
inclined to award exemplary damages if a product subsequently causes injury. 
Example 
Manufacturer produces 200,000 widgets and sells them to consumers. Manufacturer hears of 
several claims from consumers who say that they have been injured when a component part of the 
widget has broken. Manufacturer has knowingly incorporated a design defect into the widget to cut 
down costs in the form of a low quality component which may cause breakages through normal 
use in up to 80% of the total widgets sold (totalling around 120,000 widgets). Manufacturer also 
fails to warn consumers of the defect and decides that it will not recall the widgets because of the 
cost and time involved in doing so. Manufacturer believes that although there is a reasonably high 
risk that a number of people will be injured by the widget, ACC will pick up the cost of those 
claims and Manufacturer will not be directly liable. 
In this situation, Manufacturer was arguably negligent in knowingly incorporating an avoidable 
defect, in failing to warn the consumer and in failing to order a recall of the widgets. Because the 
faulty widgets cause physical injury, the injured persons are covered under the ARCIA. However, 
due to the fact that the injury is not too serious, these people receive hardly any compensation 
under the ARCIA. It is conceivable that the injured persons may be able to bring a successful 
claim for exemplary damages against Manufacturer on the grounds that Manufacturer deliberately 
ignored the problems that were being caused by defective widgets. 
4 Product Liability falling outside the scope of the ARCIA
42 
If it is arguable that a plaintiff's injuries are not covered by the ARCIA, then the injured person can 
bring a proceedings in a New Zealand court without reference to the ARCIA in the statement of 
claim. In such situations the plaintiff is not required to prove that the ARCIA does not apply.
43 
42 
43 
Most of the examples given in this part of the paper are necessarily speculative as cases on point have 
not arisen in the short time since the enactment of the 1992 regime. Examples cited are possible 
situations which might fall outside the scope of the Act. The definitive answers will turn on judicial 
interpretation of the relevant sections of the Act. For a discussion of situations which may fall outside 
the cover of the Act see also S Todd and J Black "Accident Compensation and the Barring of Actions 
for Damages" [ 1993] I Tort Law Review I 97, and R Harrison Matters of Life and Death: the Accident 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 and Common Law Claims for Personal Injury 
(Legal Research Foundation No.35 , Auckland, 1993). 
D Rennie Brooker's Accident Compensation in New Zealand (Brookers, Wellington, 1992), 2A-4. 
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Instead the defendant must prove that the injury does fall within the cover of the ARCIA. The court 
must then determine the issue after hearing evidence from the ACC. 
Examples of product liability situations that might not covered 
No personal iniury under the Act -
Heart attacks and strokes 
Certain injuries such as heart attacks and strokes are generally not covered by the ARCIA.
44 It is 
conceivable that defective goods may cause this type of injury in certain circumstances, meaning 
that the injured person could try to recover damages if the facts give rise to a cause of action. For 
example, a washing machine with a defective bearing could strike a wall that may cause a shock-
induced heart attack in a susceptible person. 
Nervous shock 
If an occurrence results in nervous shock that is not a consequence of a physical injury, then the 
injured person could bring a common law damages claim if a cause of action is available. A victim 
of mental trauma could bring a compensation claim where the trauma was the direct result of 
witnessing negligently caused injury to another person, for example if a negligently manufactured 
winch caused building materials to be dropped onto a person standing nearby.
45 Direct shock could 
be caused by a product exploding, with resulting nervous shock but no physical injury. 
Expressly excluded from cover under section 10 -
Use of teeth 
Personal injury to teeth that is caused by the natural use of those teeth is not covered by the 
ARCIA.46 Teeth might be damaged by a product during the natural use of those teeth. For 
example, biting into a pie with a bolt in it could cause damage to teeth that would not be covered 
by the ARCIA.47 Under current New Zealand law, the bolt-biter could be compensated under the 
Consumer Guarantees Act, Sale of Goods Act or a common law negligence action if appropriate. 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Under section 4 of the Act, heart attacks and strokes are only covered by the Act if they are the result of 
medical misadventure or are work related. 
Depending on the interpretation of section 14(1) this claim may or may not be barred as arising directly 
or indirectly out of personal injury to another person. 
Section I 0(2)(b ). 
This occurred in Partner v ARCIC Unreported, 20 February 1995, High Court, Auckland Registry, 
180/93. (Blanchard J) 
LAW LIBR~RY 
VERSITY Of W
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Gradual Process or disease that is not in the course of employment 
Section 10 expressly excludes from cover any personal injury that is caused by gradual process, 
disease or infection that is not employment related. A person might have a common law cause of 
action where long term exposure to a negligently manufactured computer screen resulted in a 
blood disease due to excessive radiation levels. Or, the use of a badly designed exercise machine 
over a period of time, which causes personal injury. In this case the victim might not be able to 
point to a specific event or series of events that caused the injury. On the basis of developments in 
the United States it may even be arguable that a cigarette manufacturer could be sued in some 
circumstances. 
A cause ofiniury which is not an accident, and cover is not provided elsewhere in the Act 
Under section 3(e) a personal injury will be caused by accident if it involves the absorption of any 
chemical through the skin within a defined period of time not exceeding one month. Imagine a 
situation where a manufacturer produces a hand cleaner which causes injury by absorption through 
skin over a period exceeding one month. In this case there is unlikely to be any cover under the 
ARCIA.
48 
5 Medical Product Liability 
The practice of medicine is a field in which product liability claims may arise due to the nature of 
the drug and medical product manufacturing industries. 
An injured person may have a common law claim against a manufacturer where a medical product 
is found to be faulty due to negligence during the manufacturing/research process. If there are no 
circumstances to put the health professional on notice then the use of the product is unlikely to 
constitute "medical error" for the purposes of the Act.
49 If a product has received the requisite 
government approvals then a health professional might reasonably infer that the product is safe. 
48 Above n 43 , 2A-21. 
49 "Medical error" is defined in section 5( l) as "the failure of a registered health professional to observe a 
standard of care and skill reasonably to be expected in the circumstances." 
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The defect may give rise to a civil action unless the result of the defect can be classified as a 
"medical mishap".
50 
A current example is the use ofHGH (Human Growth Hormone) as a form of treatment. The use 
ofthis treatment has recently been linked to occurrences of Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease.
51 A disease 
such as this caused by gradual process would be prima facie excluded from cover under section 10. 
If the disease falls within the range of medical mishap then there is cover, otherwise a CJD sufferer 
might try to bring an action against the manufacturer of the drug. 
Similarly a claim may arise against a healthcare provider or manufacturer where a blood product 
causes the recipient of the blood to contract Hepatitis or HIV where: 
a) The blood was not given as part of treatment for personal injury
52
, and 
b) The situation did not fall into the category of medical misadventure. 
B Remedies for Consequential Property Damage and Pure Economic 
Loss 
1 Consumer Guarantees Act 199 3 
The Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 ("CGA") came into force in New Zealand on 1 April 1994. It 
falls within the "statutory duties" model of product liability under which liability is strict. 
The CGA protects consumers by providing statutory guarantees and remedies in respect of goods 
and services supplied to consumers in trade. The CGA can also provide relief to consumers where 
defective goods cause damage to property other than the defective goods themselves. 
"In trade" 
50 
51 
52 
"Medical mishap" is defined in section 5( l ). 
"Lawyer hopes to contact CID sufferers here" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 26 April 
1996, p 19. 
In which case cover would be provided under section 8(2)(d). 
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The Act applies to transactions where a supplier supplies goods to a consumer. A supplier is a 
person who supplies goods to a consumer "in trade". This means that the supplier must be in the 
business of supplying goods of that kind. 
53 
"Consumer" 
A consumer is a person who "acquires from a supplier goods or services of a kind ordinarily 
acquired for personal, domestic, or household use or consumption."
54 There are several exclusions. 
A consumer is not a person: 
• who acquires goods for the purpose of resupplying them in trade; 
• who will consume the goods in the course of a manufacturing process; or 
• who will use the goods to repair other goods or fixtures in trade. 
This definition tends to exclude most commercial consumers who are left to fend for themselves 
using contract or tort actions. A consumer "acquires" goods by purchasing, exchanging or being 
given the goods. Leases and hire purchase arrangements are also included. 
55 
Consequential Loss Provisions 
The primary focus of the CGA is to provide post-sale warranties m respect of the goods 
themselves. Section 6 provides a guarantee that the goods will be of acceptable quality. This 
guarantee supersedes the implied warranty of merchantable quality referred to in section 16 of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1908 ("SGA"). If goods fail to comply with this guarantee (section 7), the 
consumer has a number of remedies in respect of the goods themselves. A key characteristic of 
acceptable quality is that the goods must be safe. 
In addition to remedies in respect of the goods themselves, remedies are also available where the 
defective goods cause loss to other property. Damages can be obtained from either the supplier or 
the manufacturer/importer of the goods. The designer and other parties who play a part in the 
53 Section 2 of the CGA defines "supplier". 
54 Section 2 of the CGA defines "consumer". 
55 See definition of "acquire" in section 2. 
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manufacturing process cannot be targeted under the CGA. The policy basis for this is to enable the 
consumer to target the parties who actually make and supply the product. 
The CGA will apply to manufacturing defect, design defects and informational defects if the 
existence of the defect means that the product falls short of being of acceptable quality. 
The consumer may obtain from the [supplier/manufacturer] damages for any loss or damage 
to the consumer resulting from the failure [ of the goods to comply with the guarantee] ( other 
than loss or damage through reduction in value of the goods) which was reasonably 
foreseeable as liable to result from the failure. 
56 
Provided the CGA applies, this section should cover a personal injury if the ARCIA does not. 
Where the ARCIA applies, section 14 of the ARCIA prevents an action being taken by the injured 
person to recover compensatory damages. 
Pure Economic Loss 
The consequential loss provisions will compensate the consumer whose property is damaged by 
the behaviour of a defective product. The provisions also may extend to consequential loss of 
profits. It might be argued that loss of opportunity is covered by the provisions to some extent, to 
take account of loss of income and opportunities for greater future income. In reality, the 
manufacturer's liability to account for pure economic loss may not be as great as it seems because 
many potential business claimants will not be consumers under the Act 
Scope of Cover under the CGA 
Only the consumer (as defined in section 2 of the CGA) can claim damages under these provisions. 
This means that a person who did not "acquire" the goods cannot claim for consequential loss if 
56 Section 18(4) gives the consumer a remedy against the supplier for consequential loss. Section 27(l)(b) 
provides a similar remedy against the manufacturer. 
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goods belonging to another person cause damage.
57 "Innocent bystanders" cannot claim under the 
CGA for damage caused to their property by a product that belongs to someone else. 
The CGA has been in force for a relatively short time. To date there is no case law on the 
application of the product liability provisions in sections 18 and 27 of the Act. The following 
example arose by application of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (UK).
58 The CGA would now govern 
this type of situation. This case is an example where a plaintiff was awarded damages for 
consequential loss in the type of situation anticipated by the CGA. Under the CGA the action could 
be brought under section 18 or section 27 (the defendant was both supplier and manufacturer of the 
defective goods). 
Example: Wilson and anor. v Rickett Cockerell & Co Ltd [1954] 1 QB 598. 
"Coalite", a manufactured fuel, was supplied by the defendant coal merchants to the 
plaintiffs. The coal was to be burned in the fireplace to heat the plaintiff's house. The fire 
was made up using the coal and was lit. An explosion in the grate occurred due to the 
presence of an explosive substance in the consignment of Coalite. This explosion caused 
damage to the plaintiff's dining room and furniture in that room. 
The plaintiffs claimed against the supplier for the damage to the room and furniture. The 
Court held that although only one piece of coal was defective, the whole consignment did 
not satisfy the implied condition of merchantable quality imposed by section 14(2). The 
plaintiffs were awarded damages for their losses. 
2 Contract law I Sale of Goods Act 1908 
The Privity Problem 
Where the product that caused the damage is subject to a contract between the injured person and 
the seller, the consumer may be able to bring a civil action seeking damages against the seller for 
breach of contract. There must be a contractual nexus between the claimant and another party, who 
is usually the supplier, and the defective product must be the subject of the nexus. 
57 
58 
Subsequent purchasers of the goods and donees are considered to have acquired the goods for the 
purposes of the Act. 
Although this example is taken from the experience in the United Kingdom, it is equally applicable in 
New Zealand as the Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) was modelled on the British version. 
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The doctrine of privity of contract severely limits the effectiveness of this remedy because this 
doctrine only those who contract to buy the goods can sue. They can only sue the person from 
whom they bought the goods. The reality in most cases is that the consumer is limited to seeking 
compensation from the retailer, because the manufacturer is probably not a party to the contract. 
Although New Zealand has the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, which allows parties outside the 
contract to sue as if they were a party to the contract, its application is limited by the requirement 
that the third party be a "beneficiary" of the contract between the actual parties. It could not be said 
that a consumer is a beneficiary of a contract of supply between a manufacturer and a retailer. 
Sale of Goods Act 1908 
The SGA implies a condition of merchantable quality into contracts for the sale of goods.
59 If the 
goods do not meet with this standard then the condition has been breached. The purchaser can 
bring an action for breach of contract against the seller. 
60 
Section 48 of the CGA amends the SGA, so that where the guarantees in the CGA apply, this Act 
has primacy over the SGA. Consequently, nothing in section 16 of the SGA (merchantable quality) 
will apply to the goods if the CGA applies. However, the SGA will continue apply to transactions 
where the buyer of the goods is not a consumer (as defined in the CGA), or where the CGA does 
not apply for some other reason. An example of this would be where the buyer purchased the 
defective goods for the purpose of resupplying them, or using them in a manufacturing process. 
Under contract law the buyer can recover both the cost of the defective goods and damages for 
consequential loss. The loss must not be too remote. The damage for which compensation is 
sought must have been within the reasonable contemplation of the contracting parties as a serious 
59 This condition is implied into contracts relating to sale of goods by section l 6(b) of the Act. 
60 Section 54 gives the buyer various rights of action against the seller for a breach of warranty. The SGA 
restates the common law position that the buyer can sue the seller for damages. 
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possibility that might result from the breach, at the time the contract was made.
61 The loss must 
have been directly caused by the breach (in this case, a defect). 
3 
Example 
X is an electrical appliance retailer. X regularly buys televisions from Y, a manufacturer of 
televisions, for the purposes of selling them at retail price. X often switches the televisions on for 
display purposes. One day a television explodes for no apparent reason. The explosion causes 
damage to other goods on display in the store. X was using all the televisions in an ordinary, 
reasonable way. X wishes to recover the cost of the damage to the other appliances in the store. 
The defect can be traced back to the components of the television itself. Can X recover from Y? 
X would be able to sue Y in contract for breach of the implied condition of merchantable 
quality. X would probably be able to gain compensation for the damage to the other appliances. 
It would be within the reasonable contemplation of Y that if a defect in a television caused the 
television to explode in X' s store, other goods would most likely be damaged. 
Tort Remedies: Negligence 
In practice the tort action may be more useful than the contract action because the lack of privity 
does not bar a claim against the manufacturer of a defective product. The idea of negligence as a 
means of obtaining a remedy in product liability cases was introduced by Donoghue v 
Stephenson, 62 in which the injured plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a bottled drink that contained 
the remains of a snail. Consuming the drink had caused the plaintiff to become ill. 
Requirements for an Action 
To bring a successful claim the plaintiff must first establish that the 
manufacturer/designer/distributor was negligent, by attributing fault to that person. This task is not 
61 
62 
The principles governing remoteness of damage for breach of contract were fully considered in the case 
of Hadley v Baxendale ( 1854) 9 Exch 341. 
[ 1932] AC 562. 
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easy because the plaintiff in most product liability cases will have no direct access to the 
manufacturing or design process. The plaintiff must prove four requirements: 
63 
(i) That the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. Was the kind of damage in 
question reasonably foreseeable as a real risk? 
(ii) That the defendant breached this duty of care. Would a reasonable person in the 
position of the defendant have taken further steps to avoid the risk of harm? 
(iii) There must be physical harm (or pure economic loss in some circumstances). 
(iv) The breach of the duty of care must have caused the harm. 
In the case of manufacturing defects, a plaintiff would have to show that a person in the production 
chain was negligent. This could be a primary producer, a component manufacturer, the 
manufacturer of the end product, a designer, a distributor or anyone else involved in the process by 
which the product is made, stored or delivered into the hands of the consumer. Compare this to the 
CGA which only allows the plaintiff to sue the supplier or the manufacturer/importer. 
Design defects may pose a more difficult problem for consumers. The courts will apply a form of 
cost/benefit analysis to determine whether the reasonable manufacturer would have incorporated 
the defect into the design. 
To impose absolute liability on manufacturers for design defects would hinder technological 
progress. Assessing whether the manufacturer followed a standard of "reasonableness" means that 
consumers must tolerate a degree of defectiveness, so long as the defect is not unreasonable as 
compared to the practices of other manufacturers. This approach has the benefit of providing 
manufacturers with a benchmark against which to assess their products, and allows for some 
progress. 
For the consumer, it is not so attractive because it acknowledges that some accident will go 
uncompensated because the defect appeared "in accordance with reasonable industry practice." 
63 A complete discussion of the law relating to negligence is beyond the scope of this report. For a 
comprehensive discussion of negligence in New Zealand see SMD Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New 
Zealand (Law Book Company, Sydney, 1991 ). 
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A duty exists at common law requiring manufacturers to either warn consumers of defects of 
which they become aware, or withdraw the product from the market altogether.
64 
Res lpsa Loquitur 
Some countries have made the plaintiffs burden easier by reversing the onus of proving 
negligence in product liability cases. This is achieved in common law countries by the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur, or "the event speaks for itself'. Claimants may attempt to rely on this doctrine in 
situations where there is virtually no evidence about what happened other than the fact of the event 
itself. 
The doctrine allows the Court to infer negligence by the defendant from the mere happening of an 
event. Its application can prevent injustice in situations where the plaintiff is unable to precisely 
identify the defendant's wrongful action. It will only apply when the cause of an accident is 
unknown at the trial or there is conflicting evidence. This can be useful in situations where the 
plaintiff has limited access to information about a manufacturing process. 
There is debate about the scope of the doctrine's application in New Zealand. It is clear that it 
must be appropriate to infer negligence from the swTOunding circumstances. The accident must be 
of a kind that does not ordinarily happen if due care is taken.
65 The facts must also suggest 
negligence by the defendant in particular rather than negligence by some unidentified party. The 
evidence must support a rational inference that the fault lay somewhere within the control of the 
defendant or its employees or agents. 
In New Zealand the doctrine is not settled. One judicial view suggests that the doctrine places the 
onus of disproving negligence on the defendant. The other view suggests that the doctrine is a rule 
of evidence rather than a rule of law.
66 According to the latter view, the rule simply allows 
negligence to be inferred in appropriate situations. The defendant may be able to reverse this 
inference simply by suggesting an alternative explanation for the accident or proving reasonable 
care. 
64 
65 
66 
Wright v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1972) KIR 255 . 
Above n 63 , 282. 
Above n 63, 285 . 
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The negligence action has been used in product liability situations since Donoghue v Stephenson. 
Regardless of whether res ipsa loquitur is applied, negligence has a different emphasis to strict 
liability. To successfully prove negligence the manufacturer must still have been at fault m 
producing the defective product. 
Example 
In the Sale of Goods example above, X bought a batch of televisions from Y. A defect in one 
television caused the unit to catch on fire, causing damage in X's retail store. The defective 
wiring in the television was caused by an employee ofY who took unreasonable shortcuts in 
the soldering process. The employee knew that the method of soldering could result in the 
television short-circuiting if the unit overheated. In this situation X could sue Y for damages 
that occurred as a result ofY's negligent manufacturing process. 
The Liability of the Designer in Negligence 
A plaintiff who suffers injury or loss may also be able to recover damages from a product's 
designer, if the normal criteria for negligence are satisfied. It is conceivable that designers may 
design products which they know have the potential to be defective in certain foreseeable 
situations. If the designer does not tell anyone about this fault then he or she may be liable in 
negligence. However, it follows from applying negligence principles that designers are absolved 
from liability once they take all reasonable steps to avoid the occurrence of loss. 
For example, a designer working to a fixed budget may realise that a product is defective in some 
circumstances. The designer may avoid liability by clearly explaining to the manufacturer the 
circumstances in which the product will be defective. The onus is then shifted to the manufacturer 
to take the necessary initiatives to correct the problem. 
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IV CRITICAL EVALUATION OF EXISTING PRODUCT 
LIABILITY PROVISIONS IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Introduction 
The previous section considered the product liability framework that currently operates in 
New Zealand. This part of the paper discusses the effectiveness of that framework in practice, 
identifying weaknesses that are present in New Zealand law. Dr Ellen Beerworth made the 
following comment in 1990. It would apply equally well to New Zealand today. 
The current body of law governing liability for products in Australia is a complex and 
dishannonious marriage of ancient and modem, and of judge-made and parliament-made 
rules. The complexity of this marriage stems from the fact that diverse contractual, tortious, 
and statutory rules operate concurrently. The dishannony in the marriage derives from the 
fact that these concurrently operating rules are in many ways inconsistent. Concerns of 
inequity and disadvantage, as well as concerns that undue complexity is wasteful of resources, 
prompted a review of the current Australian position in 1987.
67 
The findings of the Australian Law Reform Commission on product liability will be referred 
to in this part of the paper.68 The pre-reform Australian regime was very similar to the current 
position in New Zealand. Policy makers in Australia concluded that the Australian law did not 
satisfy the policy goals of a successful product liability scheme. 
B Liability for personal injury 
Many of the potential holes in the cover under the ARCIA have not been tested in practice. In 
theory, it is clear that under the restrictive 1992 regime product liability cases are more likely 
than before to fall outside the cover of the ARCIA. 
67 
68 
Above n 19, 9. 
Australian Law Refonn Commiss ion Product Liability Report No. 27 (Law Reform Commission, 
Sydney, 1988). 
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A recurring criticism of the ARCIA is that it no longer accords with the principle of real 
compensation that was first stated in the "Woodhouse" Report.
69 With the abolition of lump 
sum compensation and compensation for loss of enjoyment of life, many people are 
clamouring for the return of the right to sue which, they hope, would provide larger 
compensatory awards. Other groups are seeking to have the provision of accident 
compensation opened up to the private insurance market, in an attempt to increase 
competition and reduce administrative costs.
70 This possibility merits further scrutiny but is 
outside the scope of this paper. 
Although cover under the ARCIA has been reduced by restricted definitions of key 
components such as "personal injury", in practice the Act will probably cover most product 
liability situations where personal injury or death result. Nevertheless, while the restrictive 
definitions remain in force, injuries will potentially fall outside the Act's cover. There is also 
a greater scope for victims of injury caused by defective products to bring actions for 
exemplary damages, encouraged by the chance of receiving a damages award to "top up" the 
ARCIA entitlement. 
A comprehensive critical analysis of the accident compensation scheme is outside the scope of 
this paper. It is relevant to product liability that available compensation levels are severely 
reduced under the ARCIA. The way the premiums are levied does not provide a sufficient 
incentive for manufacturers to take the optimal level of care in the production of goods 
because premiums are imposed on employers with poor accident records, rather than 
manufacturers of defective goods. The current outcomes of the ARCIA therefore do not 
accord with the policy goals of a modem product liability scheme. 
For example, a person injured by a defective product during the course of employment may be 
entitled to accident compensation under the ARCIA.
71 
Although the employer may not be at 
69 
70 
71 
Aboven 13. 
For example, the NZ Manufacturers Federation and NZ Employers Federation. See also the Reserve 
Bank Governor's comments about opening ACC up to competition in "Brash' s ACC Medicine" The 
Dominion, 15 August 1996, 1. 
The employer may also be subject to the provisions of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, 
but we will assume that employer was not at fault in this example. 
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fault, the employer's ACC premium will be loaded to take into account the cost of all claims 
made by employees for injuries arising in the course of that employment. There is no 
incentive for the manufacturer to produce a safer product, because the employer bears the cost 
of the work-related injury. 
Policy makers should consider the extent to which personal injury or death caused by 
defective products is likely to fall outside the cover of the ARCIA. If an injury does not fall 
within the cover of the ARCIA, then policy makers must consider whether any proposed 
legislation or other reform dealing with product liability should extend to such injuries. 
C Liability for property damage 
In practice, the various provisions governing consequential property damage are the most 
troublesome aspect of product liability law in New Zealand. 
1 Consumer Guarantees Act 199 3 
Sections 18( 4) and 27(1 )(b) of the CGA impose strict liability on suppliers and manufacturers 
respectively where defective products have caused loss or damage to property. 
These provisions do not require the claimant to prove fault by the manufacturer or supplier. 
They also allow claimants to recover damages from the manufacturer of the defective goods 
without being restricted by the lack of privity between themselves and the manufacturer. This 
is a significant step forward in providing adequate protection for persons who suffer loss. 
However, in the product liability context, the CGA provisions arguably do not go far enough 
in protecting the rights of loss sufferers to receive efficient and effective compensation. 
Sections 18(4) and 27(l)(b) are an incidental part of the CGA. They are not highlighted in 
such a way as to draw attention to the possibility of their application. They are contained in an 
Act that is concerned with the provision of post-sales guarantees. 
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Effective redress under the CGA in product liability situations is limited by the definition of 
"consumers".
72 
This restriction means that the benefits of the strict liability provisions can 
only be reaped by those persons who have purchased or acquired the defective goods. The 
CGA will not provide a remedy for a person who suffers loss while using the consumer's 
goods, nor will it compensate an "innocent bystander" who suffers loss caused by the goods. 
The CGA is one of New Zealand's main product liability vehicles, but it fails to address the 
situation where the loss sufferer does not "own" the defective goods. A person who is not a 
"consumer" as defined by the Act must rely either on contract law or negligence. 
Article 9(b) of the EC Directive effectively limits claims for property damage to "consumers", 
but the Directive gives plaintiffs standing to sue on a different basis which does not rely on 
the injured person's "ownership" of the goods. 
In the CGA, "consumers" are defined in relation to their status as the purchaser or "acquirer" 
of the goods which subsequently cause damage due to their defectiveness. Under the 
Directive a person can claim where defective goods cause damage to property ordinarily 
intended for private use or consumption. The restriction in the Directive arises from the nature 
of the property that is damaged, rather than the status of the claimant in relation to the goods 
that cause the damage. 
This distinction is important. Under the CGA a person cannot claim for damage to property 
where that person is effectively not the owner of the goods that cause the damage. Under the 
Directive any person can claim for damage to property regardless of their title in relation to 
that property, provided that the damage being claimed for relates to goods ordinarily intended 
for private use. 
2 Contract Law 
Contract law may provide a remedy in situations where the definition of consumer means that 
the CGA does not apply. However, it will only apply to contractual relationships directly 
72 See above n 54. 
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between the seller and the purchaser of the defective goods. If for some reason a purchaser 
does not fall within the cover of the CGA, then the purchaser can only have a remedy against 
the person from whom he or she bought the goods. There will generally be no remedy against 
the manufacturer because there is no privity of contract. Similarly, there is no protection for 
the "innocent bystander", the subsequent purchaser, the donee or the lessee. The contractual 
remedy also turns on the seller's ability to meet the purchaser's claim. 
As a policy option, the remedy is ineffective because it does not allocate the risk of loss to the 
person best able to prevent the loss. Most retailers will not even be aware of the steps 
involved in the production process and certainly will not be in a position to exercise any 
quality control over that process. Allowing the injured party to target the immediate seller for 
compensation provides only for compensating the victim. This produces a satisfactory result 
for the consumer but does not directly act as a deterrent to the manufacturer unless the seller 
brings a suit against the manufacturer. This can lead to a multiplicity of actions as suits follow 
down the chain of liability towards the party who was ultimately responsible for the defect. 
The chain may be broken by a contractual clause excluding liability, or by an insolvency. 
This process is inefficient because it leads to greatly increased costs in the recovery process, 
which may result in inflated prices. In practice the contractual action will only be used by 
"commercial" consumers, who do not fall under the CGA. 
3 Negligence 
Where neither the CGA nor contract law apply, the negligence action is often the last resort of 
the loss sufferer. The law of negligence has many identifiable deficiencies in product liability 
cases: 
• The person who suffers damage must generally prove fault by the manufacturer.
73 
Without 
access to the manufacturing process this burden is difficult to satisfy in many cases. This 
situation is heavily weighted in favour of the producer and is a significant barrier to 
consumer redress in product liability cases. 
73 See above n 63. 
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• The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be invoked in some cases, although its application is 
entirely at the Court's discretion. The entire doctrine is a matter of uncertainty in New 
Zealand therefore its usefulness is limited because of its unpredictability. 
74 
• There is a high cost barrier involved in bringing a negligence action. 
Proving a claim grounded m fault-based liability 1s far more costly and complex due to 
several factors: 75 
• To prove that the defendant breached a duty of care, the plaintiff must be fully informed 
about the defendant's manufacturing processes. This problem is made easier by 
procedures of discovery and interrogatories. A plaintiff can also obtain expert evidence in 
their favour, however this evidence can often be rebutted by expert witnesses with an 
opposing view. Expert witnesses are costly. 
• It is often difficult to identify the act or om1ss1on which led to the production of a 
"defective" product. A manufacturer may avoid liability by establishing that the defect lay 
in a component part of the product. In this situation, the plaintiff must try to join the 
component manufacturer to the action, further increasing overall costs. Unless large sums 
of money are involved, consumers may be likely to give up before this stage in the 
process. 
• Even if the act or omission can be identified, the plaintiff must prove that it constituted a 
breach of the duty of care owed to the plaintiff. Without knowledge of industry practice 
this will be difficult in most cases. 
74 
75 
See above n 63 . 285. 
Several of the following criticisms were put forward by the ALRC in their discussion paper on product 
liability reform in 1988. Above n 12, from page 12. 
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• Ultimately, due to cost barriers and practical barriers, the negligence action does not meet 
the policy goal of efficient and effective compensation, although in theory it has the 
potential to encourage optimal levels of care in production. 
4 General criticisms 
Multiple parties 
In a contract or CGA action, the plaintiff can directly target the manufacturer or the supplier.
76 
In a negligence action, the plaintiff may end up suing every identifiable person whose acts or 
omissions may have caused the goods to be defective. The plaintiff will have to consider 
joining the designer of the goods, a component manufacturer, a supplier of raw materials, a 
distributor and a retailer. This consumes the resources of the plaintiff, the courts and the 
potential defendants. 
Inconsistencies in burden of proof 
Liability in contract and under the CGA is strict. Liability in negligence is fault-based. The 
result is that the manufacturer's liability for producing a defective product that causes damage 
will be different depending on whether the person who suffered the loss is a "consumer" as 
defined in the CGA. Liability under the CGA or contract depends on the state of the goods. 
Liability in negligence depends on the conduct of the manufacturer. It is conceivable that one 
defective product could give rise to a CGA claim, a contract claim, a negligence claim or an 
ACC claim, depending on who was injured or suffered loss. 
For example, if X buys a television which explodes due to a defect and damages property, 
then X has redress against the manufacturer in strict liability under the CGA. If X takes his 
television around to Y's house and the television explodes, damaging Y's property, the 
situation is different. X may claim against the manufacturer under the CGA for damage 
caused to Y's property. Y may not claim directly against the manufacturer under the CGA for 
the damage to her own property because the defective television did not belong to her. 
76 Subject to privity considerations in the case of the contract action. 
- 41 -
The liability of the manufacturer will vary depending on the relationship between the 
manufacturer and the person who suffers the loss. The relationship between the manufacturer 
of the goods and the person affected by those goods should be irrelevant in defining the 
manufacturer's liability for producing defective goods. 
There is no logical reason why a person who suffers loss while using a product that he or she 
has purchased should get the benefit of strict liability, while the person standing next to them 
who also suffers loss must seek relief under the laws of negligence. This state of affairs 
simply highlights the haphazard approach by which this area of the law has developed. 
D Conclusion 
These criticisms demonstrate deficiencies in New Zealand's consumer protection framework 
that need to be corrected, as they were in Australia in 1992. The main problem is caused by 
requiring injured persons to resort to negligence actions where the CGA or contract law do not 
assist them. This does not equate with efficient and effective compensation for persons who 
suffer injury or loss. Why should a person who did not purchase or acquire the defective 
goods have to satisfy a different burden to someone who did purchase or acquire the defective 
goods? 
Second, many of the existing provisions do not encourage manufacturers to take optimal 
levels of care in manufacturing their products. The lack of incentive is particularly apparent in 
the personal injury field due to the operation of the ARCIA. In the area of property damage, 
the CGA goes some way towards allowing the loss sufferer to directly target the 
manufacturer, but it is submitted that the CGA does not go far enough because of restrictions 
on the application of the Act. 
The majority of the Tort and General Law Reform Committee (1974) considered the tendency in 
many cases for the manufacturer to settle in order to protect its commercial reputation and 
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advanced this as a reason for not reforming product liability law in New Zealand in 1974.77 
However, reliance should not be placed on a manufacturer's discretionary ability to settle a case 
out of court. This is not an adequate reason for retaining the current deficiencies in the law. 
It is true that the main drive towards strict liability in the product liability arena has centred on 
personal injury claims. 
78 
Although the personal injury consequences of defective products are 
potentially more devastating, the protection of property should not be underplayed as an important 
aspect oflaw in New Zealand. 
The Committee observed that claims for property damage caused by defective products in which 
the plaintiff does not obtain reasonable compensation are rare. A survey should be undertaken to 
determine whether this is still the case. It is possible that litigation is rare because the claimant 
either cannot afford to bring an action, or the chance of success does not match the investment of 
resources into the case. Even if claims of this kind are rare, it does not follow that current 
deficiencies in the law should not be remedied. While there exists a mere potential for injustices to 
occur, reform should be seriously considered. The current lack of rain is not a satisfactory reason 
for ignoring the hole in the roof 
77 
78 
New Zealand Torts and General Law Reform Committee Product Liability (Ministry of Justice, 1974) 
23. 
This can be seen in the emphasis of the EC Directive on personal injury. Property damage in the 
Directive is given a more restricted scope. See above n 17. 
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V REFORM OPTIONS 
A Important elements of Product Liability Systems 
In my opinion, the following considerations should be taken into account when evaluating the 
effectiveness of any product liability framework. 
• The system should not acts as a disincentive towards the production of goods using all 
reasonable care. A properly functioning product liability system should have a degree of 
deterrent effect against the production of defective goods, that will complement existing 
regulatory measures. 
• Effective compensation should be one of the pnmary considerations of any product 
liability scheme. The scheme should allow the party who has suffered loss to seek an 
adequate remedy for that loss. This entails both efficiency in recovery without incurring 
unnecessary litigation costs, and adequate compensation for the loss suffered. The primary 
focus of the scheme should be compensatory. 
• An effective product liability scheme should allocate the cost of losses caused by defective 
products to the party that is in the best position to bear the loss and take steps to prevent it. 
• The framework should be internally consistent so as to avoid the situation where the same 
defective product gives rise to many different remedies and causes of action depending on 
the status of the injured person. 
• The impact of the product liability scheme on international trade should be taken into 
account. The scheme should not adversely affect the flow of trade between countries, and 
should seek to enhance it as far as possible. 
• Many power imbalances can be caused by the difficulties encountered in seeking 
compensation; the scheme should be relatively easy for the consumer to use, and should 
aim to address such imbalances. 
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B Statutory Strict Liability - The EC Directive and Australian Product 
Liability 
1 Why are Overseas Developments Relevant to New Zealand? 
The· future direction of consumer policy in New Zealand need not be dictated by 
developments overseas, but policy makers should seek to benefit from overseas experiences. 
Harmonisation of consumer protection laws between trading partners is an effective way of 
breaking down barriers to international trade. 
A key objective of CER (Closer Economic Relations) is to minimise trade barriers through 
harmonisation of laws. 79 
Australia enacted a new product liability regime m 1992. 80 The Australian regime was 
modelled closely on the EC Directive on product liability that was issued in 1985.
81 The 
Directive is a substantial step towards standardisation. 
Under the terms of the Treaty of Rome, all the member States of the European Community 
(now the European Union) were required to implement the substance of the Directive into 
their domestic law. The EU is one of New Zealand's major trading partners. Now the 
influence of the Directive can be seen in domestic product liability laws in countries far 
beyond the borders of the EU itself. 
Overseas developments are also valuable to New Zealand because they form a useful "testing 
ground" for policies that New Zealand could consider. 
79 
80 
8 1 
CER is the trans-Tasman free trade agreement to which Australia and New Zealand are signatories. The 
harmonisation process is already well underway. An example of harmonisation of consumer laws is 
New Zealand's Fair Trading Act 1986. A conscious effort was made to draft this legislation using the 
Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 as a model. 
Part VA of the Trade Practices Act 1974. 
See above n 17. 
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2 Background to the EC Directive 
In the late 1970s the Commission of the EC began to consider the issue of product liability 
reform with a view to issuing a Directive to member States. The principal motivation behind 
the Directive was a desire to achieve uniform product liability laws between the various 
member States, and a realisation that existing laws did not provide adequate compensation for 
consumers or adequate incentives for the production of safe goods. 
The desire for uniformity was prompted by a concern over the protection of consumers and 
the barriers to international trade that could be presented by divergent domestic product 
liability laws. 
Through issuing the Directive to all member States, the Commission enabled reform to occur 
on a uniform basis throughout Europe. The underlying philosophy of the Directive is stated in 
its preamble, 
Whereas liability without fault on the part of the manufacturer is the sole means of adequately 
solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of 
the risks inherent in modem technological production. 
3 Application of the Directive 
The key principle outlined in Article 1 of the Directive is that manufacturers shall be liable 
without fault for damage caused by defects in their products. This is the principle of strict 
liability. 
The Directive applies to all movable property. 
82 
Individual states have the option of applying 
the Directive to agricultural produce. 
"Producer" is defined so as to include: 
• A manufacturer of a finished product or component, 
83 
82 Article 2. 
83 Article 3, para I. 
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• Any person holding themselves out to be the manufacturer, 84 
• Importers of a product into the EC (without prejudice to the liability of the 
producer),85 
• The supplier (if the supplier fails to divulge the identity of the manufacturer).86 
4 Requirements for liability 
Article 4 requires that the injured person must prove three things: damage, defectiveness of the 
goods, and a causal relationship between the defect and the damage. 
Damage 
"Damage" is defined in Article 9. The Article is prescribed without prejudice to national 
provisions relating to non-material damage. 87 Damage means personal injury and death, or 
damage to property other than the defective goods themselves. Pure economic loss does not 
appear to be covered under the Directive. 
A limitation has been placed on an injured person 's ability to claim for consequential damage 
to property. Claims are effectively limited to consumer goods, defined by reference to use and 
value. 
The restriction on claims for property damage suggests that the primary focus of the Directive 
is on liability for causing personal injury. 
Defect 
Rights arise under the Directive where a damage-causing product is defective. 
88 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
Article 3, para 1. 
Article 3, para 2. 
Article 3, para 3. 
The effect of this proviso is that domestic laws relating to recovery of damages for pure economic loss 
will not be affected by the implementation of the Directive. 
"Defective" is defined in Article 6. 
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A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to 
expect, taking all circumstances into account, including: 
(a) Presentation of the product; 
(b) The use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product 
would be put; 
( c) The time when the product was put into circulation. 
(d) A product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better 
product is subsequently put into circulation. 
Whether a product is considered to be defective turns on the application of an objective test -
what would the ordinary person expect?89 
Defences 
There are a number of limited defences to an action brought under the Directive: 
It is a defence if the defendant proves that: 
• the defendant did not put the product into circulation; or 
• It was probable that the defect came into being after the goods were put into circulation; or 
• The product was not manufactured for commercial purposes; or 
• The defect was due to compliance of the product with mandatory legal requirements; or 
• That the state of scientific or technical knowledge at the time the goods were put into 
circulation were not such as to allow the existence of the defect to be discovered (the 
"development risks" defence); or 
• That the defect in a component is attributable to the design of the product in which the 
component has been fitted. This defence will exculpate a component manufacturer where 
a component part has been used in a design for which it is not entirely suitable. 
The 'development risks' defence referred to above is the most controversial. Several States, 
including the United Kingdom would not have agreed to the Directive unless the defence was 
89 This objective test is similar to the test for "acceptable quality" of goods under the Consumer 
Guarantees Act. See section 7 of the Act. 
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included. The Directive allows members to decide whether to include this defence in their 
domestic law.90 
This defence may arise more commonly in cases involving pharmaceuticals and chemicals. 
Such products may be placed on the market at a time when the state of scientific knowledge is 
insufficient to allow the discovery of a defect. The drug industry is often creating products for 
which the longterm effects may not be fully understood. 91 
Although the defence appears to give manufacturers a significant means of avoiding liability, 
the scope of the defence may be narrower than it first appears. For the defence to apply, the 
defect must not have been discoverable at all at the time of manufacture, rather than not being 
reasonably discoverable. This is an absolute standard. 
The defence was allows into the Directive on the basis that denial of the defence would 
impose "liability both too extensive and unpredictable in scope, and might inhibit socially 
desirable innovation in the development of new products."92 
The Directive also allows States to impose a limit on recoverable damages that arise as a 
result of a defect in a single product. 
93 
5 Significance of the Directive as an International Model for Reform 
The Directive allowed member States a period of three years in which to incorporate the 
Directive into their domestic law. France has yet to implement the Directive. 
94 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
Luxembourg has included the defence. 
The Dalkon Shield for example, the use of which could lead to sterility or even death. 
D Harland "The Legal System on Product and Service Liability - The Australian Experience" 
Conference Paper, JASCA Conference, Kyoto, Japan, 1994. 
Article 16. 
Members of the EC at the time the Directive was issued were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
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As a result of the 1992 European Economic Area Agreement, six other European countries 
have implemented the Directives principles into their domestic law.95 Other European 
countries have implemented the Directive while being under no obligation to do so, including 
Hungary, Switzerland and Russia. 
The writer considers that the Directive has become the leading model for product liability 
reform in the western world. It embodies a worldwide belief that the future of product liability 
lies in a strict liability system. The influence of the Directive can also be seen in Israel, Brazil 
and the Philippines. Japan enacted the Product Liability Law of 1994 that is clearly modelled 
on the Directive. Australia has based its 1992 amendment to the Trade Practices Act 197 4 on 
the Directive. 
B Product Liability in Australia 
1 Background to the Australian Reforms 
Before 1992, the framework of laws governing product liability in Australia closely resembled 
the current provisions in New Zealand. Product liability actions were based on tort, contract 
and Part 2A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 which is essentially the same as New Zealand's 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993. 
Although liability of the manufacturer for damage caused by defective products is strict under 
Part 2A of the Trade Practices Act, recovery is limited to consumers as defined under that 
Act. A person who does not purchase or acquire the defective product cannot seek damages 
under the Act. 96 The possibility of recovering damages for personal injury or property damage 
is an incidental part of the legislation rather than a major focus. 
95 
96 
Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Sweden. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the 
EU on 1 January 1995. 
Section 4B of the Trade Practices Act 1974. 
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In 1987 the National Consumer Affairs Advisory Council recommended that a comprehensive 
study be undertaken to determine the adequacy of existing remedies and examine the viability 
of enacting a form of strict product liability. The Australian Law Reform Commission 
published its report in 1988,97 concluding that reform was clearly necessary for reasons of 
consumer policy and economic efficiency. 
The ALRC argued for a radical form of manufacturer's liability that turned on whether a 
product caused injury. The recommendations departed from the EC Directive by removing the 
need for a plaintiff to show that a product was defective. The claimant would only be required 
to show a causal link between the behaviour of the product and the injury. The Committee 
considered that the test for defectiveness as outlined in the Directive would lead to the same 
unpredictable outcomes that have resulted from the use of the "reasonable care" test in the law 
of negligence. 
The ALRC recommended that manufacturers and suppliers of goods should be liable for loss 
caused by those goods if the loss was caused by the way the goods acted. The plaintiff would 
not need to focus on whether the goods failed to comply with some standard of safety or 
quality, which many commentators saw as inviting the courts to balance risks and benefits in a 
similar way to the law of negligence.98 Harland notes that under the new product liability law 
in Australia, courts will "often in effect be asked to decide what level of safety is socially 
acceptable in our community for this type of product, given that absolute safety is 
unattainable. "99 
The report prompted extensive debate. Industry sectors in Australia considered that the 
proposed focus on causation alone would impose too heavy a burden on manufacturers. 
100 
The federal government saw the ALRC's radical reform as being too hard on producers. This 
97 
98 
99 
100 
Above n 19. 
See for example J Stapleton "Products liability reform - real or illusory" (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 392. 
D Harland "The Legal System on product and Service Liability - the Australian Experience" Conference 
Paper, JASCA Conference, Kyoto, Japan, August 1994, 6. 
Commonwealth of Australia, Industry Commission Product Liability Report No.51, 1989. 
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form of the proposal was not adopted. Instead the federal government chose to follow the 
model provided by the EC Directive as a compromise solution. 
2 Why did the ALRC recommend reform? 
The ALRC measured the existing state of product liability provisions in Australia against 
three benchmarks to determine whether the existing law was performing satisfactorily. The 
following paragraphs will examine some of the ALRC's findings. This section will simply 
illustrate the types of finding that were made: 
Policy Grounds 
(a) The law must ensure that those who manufacture and supply goods - and their 
customers - bear the risk of losses caused by what the goods do. 101 
The ALRC found that the Australian law failed to match the 'risks' with the benefits for six 
independent reasons. 102 For example, the existing law drew a distinction between classes of 
people who suffer loss. The law regarded a buyer differently to a non-buyer in situations 
where goods caused damage or injury. Second, it may be impossible to identify the party who 
is responsible for what the goods did. Third, the measure of damages differed depending on 
the cause of action pleaded, which does not necessarily bear any rational relation to the loss 
suffered by the claimant 
(b) The law should properly take account of other factors involved in the occurrence of 
The ALRC found that the existing law failed to meet this policy objective in most cases. The 
conduct of the claimant, which may have contributed to the loss, was not sufficiently 
emphasised in the existing law. 
IOI 
102 
This standard and those that follow are taken from the ALRC report, above n 68, 35-36. 
Three of these reasons will be mentioned in this paper. 
- 52 -
(c) The law should minimise the cost of recovery 
The ALRC found that transaction costs relating to the existing causes of action, especially 
negligence, were high. 
Economic Efficiency 
The main criticism in this area was that the existing law relied too heavily on vague standards. 
The ALRC suggested that this vagueness would generally produce inefficient allocation of 
resources by persons involved in the manufacture and supply of goods, which would lead to 
price distortions. 
Empirical Evidence 
Although there was some debate over the quality of the evidence produced, the ALRC 
concluded that there was some cause for concern about: 
• The number of injuries and deaths caused by goods 
• The degree to which several aspects of the existing law presented a barrier to the 
enforcement of the rights that it conferred. 
By matching the existing law against the three standards above, the ALRC identified 
unacceptable inadequacies in Australia' s existing law and established a clear need for reform. 
4 The Reform 
Part VA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 came into force on 9 July 1992. The amendment 
contains the product liability reforms eventually decided upnn by the Australian government. 
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5 How has Australia implemented the Directive? 
The prov1s10ns of the TPA relating to the form of liability, interpretation of defect and 
damage, and the defences do not depart from those in the Directive. Australia has included the 
"development risks" defence in their legislation. 
There is a limitation period of three years from the time the plaintiff became aware or ought 
reasonably to have become aware of the loss, the defect and the identity of the manufacturer. 
Also in accordance with the Directive is the "statute of repose" provision, which extinguishes 
the cause of action if action is not commenced within 10 years from the time of the supply by 
the manufacturer of the actual goods that caused the injury. This provision is also 
controversial, as in some cases, especially pharmaceutical cases, the damaging effects of the 
product may not be felt until after the 10 year period has expired. 
C New Zealand's Trading Partners103 
It is important to consider the product liability schemes that have been adopted by New 
Zealand's main trading partners. The EC Directive and the reforms in Australia aimed to 
reduce barriers to international trade. Through the adoption of laws that are consistent with 
the laws of their trading partners, countries can reduce barriers to trade between each other. 
1 Australia 
Australia is New Zealand's largest trading partner. Due to CER, New Zealand has a positive 
obligation to take steps to remove barriers to trade between the two countries. Australia has 
adopted a strict product liability regime in the form discussed above. 
2 
103 
Japan 
According to statistics obtained from Statistics New Zealand, for the year ending August 1995, New 
Zealand's top five trading partners are, (in descending order of amount of trade conducted in monetary 
terms), Australia, Japan, United States of America, United Kingdom and Germany. 
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New Zealand is trading increasingly with Japan. In 1994, Japan enacted a product liability 
law that imposes strict liability on manufacturers of defective products. The Product Liability 
Law of 1994 is modelled closely on the EC Directive. 
3 rr · d S 104 unite tates 
New Zealand still conducts a large amount of its trade with the United States. Product 
liability in the United States is a subset of tort law. It operates on strict liability principles - a 
plaintiff is not require to prove fault by a manufacturer if the product is defective in the sense 
of being "unreasonably dangerous". However, certain legal structures and principles mean 
that the United States has a unique way of dealing with product liability claims.
105 Factors 
affecting the process include; the role of the jury, court procedures, different approach of 
courts to the application of precedent and to certainty and predictability in the law. 
4 Europe 
New Zealand conducts a large amount of trade with the EU. All the EU countries except 
France have now implemented the Directive into their domestic law. '
06 
5 Conclusion 
All of New Zealand's major trading partners operate in accordance with a strict liability 
system of product liability. At present New Zealand does not have such a scheme. An 
analysis of the economic effects of this difference is beyond the scope of this paper. Policy 
makers should consider the extent to which, if at all, trade with New Zealand's major trading 
partners might be enhanced by enacting some form of strict liability scheme in New Zealand. 
104 
105 
106 
The United States' approach to product liability cannot be accurately explained within the constraints of 
this paper. For a brief summary of the US system, see For further reading on comparative product 
liability laws see generally CJ Miller (ed) Comparative Product Liability (British Institute of 
International Comparative Law, London, 1986) and G Howells and JJ Phillips (eds) Product Liability 
(Barry Rose, Chichester, 1991). See also G Howells Comparative Product Liability (Dartmouth, 
Aldershot, 1993). 
This statement about the law in the United States is taken from Beerworth ' s book, above n 19. 
For a list of the countries who are members of the European Union, see above n 94 and 95. 
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D Consideration of Directive - based Liability 
Advantages 
• Modem methods of production and distribution impose an unfair burden on injured 
persons in requiring them to prove negligence against a manufacturer. Fault liability is 
recognised as a costly and inefficient means by which to seeks redress. 
• Individuals in the current economic climate are more likely to under insure themselves that 
manufacturers. It is unfair to put the onerous on individuals to insure themselves against 
loss, which can have a devastating effect on the individual. Personal insurance also 
provides less of an incentive for manufacturers to improve their system. It is better for the 
cost of defects to be spread around all consumers through increased pricing due to 
increased premiums paid by manufacturers. 
• Considering the insurance aspects of strict liability, the practical effect of manufacturers 
taking out insurance will act as a deterrent, as consumers will tend towards a cheaper, more 
effective product. Insurance companies should increase premiums or refuse to extend cover 
to a company with a bad record. This will also act as a deterrent. 
• There is a moral obligation which dictates that responsibility for a defective product should 
lie with the manufacturer of those products, because they are in the best position to prevent 
the defect. 
• Strict liability (in a statutory form) may discourage litigation, which means that there may 
be more settlements as it will be clearer whether the manufacturer is liable. 
• Some would argue that the way "defectiveness" will be interpreted under a Directive-based 
scheme does not differ greatly from the cost/benefit analysis applied under negligence law. 
However this argument applies more readily to design defects than manufacturing defects. 
Manufacturing defects, being inadvertent, will be effectively assessed against the 
manufacturer's own standards, and therefore will be found to be defective even though 
there may be no actual negligence involved. This is an advantage to the consumer. 
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In spite of the criticisms of the "defectiveness" concept, the situation in respect of design 
defects will be no worse than the existing negligence law, and it may be substantially easier 
for the consumer to receive effective compensation. 
Disadvantages 
• Manufacturers would inevitably incorporate insurance costs into the price of the product, 
thus resulting in increased cost which would be passed on to consumers. This might be 
detrimental to the consuming public as a whole. This may also result in New Zealand 
products becoming less competitive in the international market. 
• The manufacturer may be held liable for marketing and design defects which are not within 
the ambit of the manufacturer's control. 
• Under a Directive model, manufacturers appears to have no positive obligation to order a 
product recall once they become aware of a defect. 
E Implementation Options for Statutory Strict liability 
The discussion above has centred around a statutory form of strict liability as a viable option 
for product liability reform in New Zealand. If this type of reform were adopted, the key 
question is whether product liability deserves its own statute, or whether product liability 
amendments could be annexed to an existing statute. 
1 A Self-Contained Product Liability Law 
Japan opted for a discrete product liability statute. Codifying product liability law into one 
statute would lend clarity to the end result. The target users of the law (being the consuming 
public as a whole) would more easily understand what that law was about, which would make 
the law more accessible. It would be possible to take Part VA of the Trade Practices Act 
(Australia) and translate it into the New Zealand situation under a single statute. This is an 
. l 'd d ,01 option which should be senous y cons1 ere . 
107 This paper has only provided the reader with the "bare bones" of the Australian scheme. For a more 
detailed analysis of Part VA, readers should refer to Beerworth, above n 19. 
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One of the major issues facing New Zealand product liability law is that standing to sue under 
the CGA is limited to those who exercise some form of ownership over the defective product. 
Adopting the terms of the Directive would give standing to a class of people who are likely to 
suffer product-related loss or damage, eliminating the practical inconsistencies caused by the 
drafting of the CGA. 
While personal injury is largely covered under the ARCIA, a policy issue is whether a 
separate statute is warranted. I believe that it is, although the personal injury side to the 
legislation would be subject to the ARCIA, in particular section 14. The existence of the new 
product liability law should not preclude the consumer from pursuing other available 
remedies. 
2 Product liability under an Existing Statute 
It would be possible for New Zealand to enact an amendment to one of our existing statutes to 
incorporate the EC model of strict liability. The two possible candidates for amendment are 
the Fair Trading Act 1986 and the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993. 
The CGA already deals with product liability to some extent therefore some would argue that 
it could simply be extended to include the provisions of the EC Directive. However, under the 
current provisions of the CGA, relief is limited to consumers, as defined in the Act and 
discussed above. To properly introduce strict liability as under the EC Directive, an 
amendment to the CGA would require the use of a broader definition of "consumer". 
The existing definition of consumer is appropriate for the CGA because it provides guarantees 
and remedies to those who have "acquired" the goods. This is entirely appropriate in the 
context of an Act which is designed to give remedies to consumers of goods and services 
where the goods or services do not meet a certain standard. As discussed earlier, product 
liability does not focus on the relationship between the manufacturer and consumer so much 
as the effect of the defective product on the consumer. Bearing this in mind, effective 
implementation of the EC Directive would require a wider definition of "consumer" to be 
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used in the part of the Act which dealt with product liability. The use of two definitions of 
"consumer" in the same Act would lead to unnecessary confusion. 
Consequently it is submitted that the CGA is not a suitable vehicle for product liability 
reform. 
The Fair Trading Act ("FTA") may accommodate product liability amendments more 
comfortably. If a distinct product liability Act were unsuitable for New Zealand conditions, 
then an amendment to the FT A could be considered. 
The FT A already deals with issues of product safety regulation under Part III. It would be 
possible to simply add another Part to deal with product liability, avoiding the confusion that 
would result from amending the CGA. 
F Extension of Tort Law 
1 Res Ipsa Loquitur 
From the injured plaintiffs point of view, one of the most onerous aspects of negligence as a 
cause of action is the burden of proof which requires the plaintiff to prove that the 
manufacturer ( or some other party) was at fault. 
If the negligence action is to be useful in the product liability context, then codification of res 
ipsa loquitur should be considered. If codification is not possible then clear judicial 
guidelines should be set down at Court of Appeal level. Res ipsa loquitur has potential to ease 
some of the difficulties encountered by plaintiffs when bringing a negligence action, but at 
present it is perhaps too discretionary and unpredictable to be relied on by plaintiffs in product 
liability cases. 
The Torts and General Law Reform Committee (1974) considered that this doctrine could 
ease some of the harshness consumers faced under existing law.
108 
Referring to the adoption of 
108 Above n 77. 
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strict liability rather than use of res ipsa loquitur the minority considered that "it is preferable as a 
matter of principle to adopt openly, directly and consistently a rule that comes close to being 
achieved in practice anyway." 10
9 
Ultimately the clarification of res ipsa loquitur as a solution would be a satisfactory stop-gap 
measure, perhaps if personal injury compensation reform was imminent. As a long term solution 
the proposal does not address the existing problems with consistency between remedies. 
As an additional cautionary note, Beerworth comments , 
Our society should not lose sight of the fact that the casting of the burden of proof onto 
plaintiffs acts as a safeguard in the administration of justice, and that the burden is only ever 
reversed in very limited and discrete circumstances. In our rush to compensate consumers 
suffering product-related loss or damage, our society should also not assume that justice is the 
sole prerogative of consumers."
110 
2 The United States Approach 
Instead of enacting product liability legislation, the United States legislature married concepts 
of "unreasonable danger" and defectiveness together into S402A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts. Liability will arise where a product is in a "defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous" to persons and subsequently causes harm. 
As indicated by Clark, 111 these four words have led courts in the United States to a variety of 
views about the criteria for liability, which has caused considerable problems and resulted in a 
mass of literature on the subject. The lack of statutory guidelines appears to have caused the 
courts to have divergent views on the conceptual basis of defectiveness. 
The United States version of product liability would appear to be more flexible, but flexibility 
often pairs itself with a degree of uncertainty. Uncertainty is a feature of existing negligence law 
109 Above n 77 . 
I 10 Above n 19, 33. 
Ill A Clark "The Conceptual Basis of Product Liability" (1985) Mod L Rev 325. 
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which could be avoided by a statutory model for liability. Consumers should (and arguably have a 
right to) understand law which protects them. It is difficult to see how this could be achieved other 
than by using a statutory model. 
G Compulsory Insurance 
Some commentators may suggest that the predominance of house and contents insurance in New 
Zealand today means that from a practical perspective, product liability involving property damage 
cases will more than likely be covered by the individual's insurance rather than proceeding to a 
formal action through the courts. 
In particular, this view was adopted by the majority of the Torts and General Law Reform 
Committee (1974) in its report on product liability.
112 The Committee considered the possibility 
of introducing strict liability into the law governing product liability cases in New Zealand. The 
majority of the Committee concluded that modification of the law governing product liability in 
New Zealand at that time was not necessary. 
In light of the widespread practice of insuring there is good administrative reason for 
allocating the costs of any property damage to the insured individual. Payment from his own 
insurance company is likely to be quicker than payment by the manufacturer' s insurer. In the 
latter case the loss has to be investigated by two insurance companies involving duplication of 
work and extra cost. 
1 13 
This reasoning assumes that personal insurance covering property damage is widespread, and 
adequate to meet the cost of the loss. In the current economic climate it is doubtful that all people 
will be able to insure themselves adequately, if at all, against loss of this kind. The minority of the 
. dthi . 114 Committee recognise s pomt. 
11 2 
113 
114 
Above n 77. 
Above n 77, 22. 
Above n 77, 24 . 
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The majority also considered that "there is good administrative reason for allocating the costs of 
any property damage to the insured individual."
115 The policy assumption behind this conclusion 
suggests that people are effectively obliged to insure themselves against the loss because the 
administrative costs will be reduced. Consequently, if individuals fail to insure themselves, the law 
may not be able to provide a satisfactory remedy. The minority of the Committee stated that "it is 
wrong in principle to restrict the manufacturer's liability on the assumption that consumers will be 
covered by insurance that they are under no obligation to carry." It is submitted consumers 
generally should not be required to take out insurance policies simply because the law fails to 
provide an adequate remedy. 
A further disadvantage with personal insurance as a means of providing remedies in product 
liability situations is that manufacturers have less incentive to produce safe goods because they will 
not often be directly liable to compensate the injured person. They may be forced to account to the 
insurer under subrogation principles, but unless the claim is large the current state of the law means 
that the insurer may not bother to bring the claim at all. The policy goal of effective compensation 
may be satisfied, but only at great personal expense to the consumer in the form of insurance 
premiums. Secondly, the policy goal of deterrence is remains largely unsatisfied. 
H Subrogation under the ARCIA 
Some commentators may argue that we should allow the ACC to take up the common law rights 
of injured persons as against negligent manufacturer under subrogation principles, as if they were 
msurers. 
Under such a mechanism, ACC would have the power under the ARCIA to adopt the injured 
person's right to sue a negligent manufacturer/importer/designer. This would allow the ACC to 
recover the cost of compensation that has been paid out to the injured person. 
Unfortunately this proposition has three major flaws. First, under the ARCIA as it stands presently 
the injured person would be no better off than they are now unless the difference between the 
damages awarded by the court and the compensation that was paid out under the ARCIA was 
I IS Above n 77, 22. 
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forwarded to the injured person. How would the ACC choose which cases to take to court? Extra 
compensation would depend on ACC's discretion to take further action against the negligent party. 
Second, even if this was done, allowing the ACC to sue would mark a return to the inefficiencies 
of the pre-1972 system, which the accident compensation scheme intended to eliminate. 
Third, allowing the ACC to sue using the current law does not alleviate any of the difficulties that 
are encountered when suing under the current law. Ultimately the extra costs of administering this 
amendment would be passed on to those who fund the scheme - the taxpayer, employers and 
motorists. 
I Dispute Resolution Procedure 
Product liability claims tend to pit individual consumers against manufacturers, who are generally 
larger commercial entities having more cash with which to defend an action. Litigation itself 
presents a barrier to effective redress in consumer cases. Consumers often resign themselves to the 
fact that the overall costs in time and money that are involved in bringing an action render it 
unrealistic. 
In my opinion, while reform of the product liability laws will be a significant step in the right 
direction, practical implementation of any consumer law is difficult under the current judicial 
system because it is simply too daunting. The use of the Disputes Tribunal goes some way 
towards alleviating this difficulty but its jurisdiction is limited to claims involving $3000 or less, or 
$5000 by agreement between the parties. 
A prescribed disputes resolution procedure would be a useful addition to any reform in this area. I 
propose implementation in the following way. 
The consumer who suffers loss may elect whether to litigate in the courts or go through an 
alternative dispute resolution process. Under the second option, once the consumer has 
commenced proceedings, the consumer and the manufacturer would go through a compulsory 
mediation process with a Court appointed mediator. 
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This arrangement has the advantage of cutting down the procedural barrier to effective redress, and 
would result in a more accessible process that has the potential to produce equitable results. There 
is a possibility that the defendant would not be willing to put sufficient effort into mediation. 
However, the mediation would serve at least to clarify the issues and hopefully reduce the cost of 
any ensuing litigation. This process is a realistic alternative because it may achieve compensation 
where the consumer would otherwise be "litigated" out of effective redress. 
At any stage in the process, the consumer would have the option of backing out of the process and 
litigating in the normal fashion. 
- 64 -
VI CONCLUSIONS 
Being realistic, product liability law in New Zealand is not in a state of turmoil that requires 
immediate legislative action. However, as I have suggested earlier in the paper, must we wait until 
the deficiencies in the existing law manifest themselves in such a way that they can no longer be 
ignored? 
There is a need for reform in this area. Overall, the existing means of seeking redress fall short of 
providing effective compensation and encouraging optimal levels of risk prevention. 
On balancing the policy considerations, I would advocate legislative reform as the most effective 
means of bringing New Zealand's product liability law up to the standard that has been set in other 
parts of the world. In my view, there are two options which best satisfy the policy goals that have 
been discussed in this paper. 
First, a strict liability system based on the Australian model is the most preferable option. 
However, while New Zealand still has the ARCIA, any new statute would be subject to the 
ARCIA where personal injury was caused. This may mean that in practice, the personal injury 
provisions of the new statute may be under-used, but they will still be of benefit where the ARCIA 
does not apply. 
Second, Parliament could extend the FTA to take into account strict liability provisions dealing 
with property damage that are modelled on the Directive/ Australian legislation. 
Whichever option is chosen, the benefit to be gained is a law governing product liability that is 
codified into one statute, thereby reducing uncertainty and providing a consistent remedy for those 
who suffer injury or loss caused by defective products. 
Such a reform is not likely to be popular with the manufacturing and industry sectors. It would 
nevertheless be a significant step towards empowering consumers by minimising the effect of 
power imbalances caused by the existing law. 
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In the future, consumers are less likely to understand the technology that governs their daily lives 
than they are presently. Policy makers should be proactive rather than reactive in affording 
protection to the rights of consumers. 
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